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We use panel data to estimate the marginal product of transport infrastructure for 96 countries. 
Using construction costs, we also calculate rates of return to road building. Our main finding 
is that transportation infrastructure appears to have "normal" rates of return in developed 
countries, extraordinarily high rates of return in industrializing countries, and moderate rates of 
return in underdeveloped countries. Our results also imply that the effect of infrastructure is 
slow to occur but long lived: an increase in infrastructure has little short run impact on output 
but leads to a higher growth rate and higher output in the long run. 
1. Introduction. 
The aim of this paper is to estimate social rates of return on transportation infrastructure, 
across a large number of countries, over the period 1960-1985. To do this we use physical 
measures of transportation networks, kilometers of paved roads and railways, to estimate returns 
in the form of higher aggregate output, and relate these returns to construction costs. Our main 
result is that these rates of return vary greatly across countries, with four broad groups 
appearing. Within developed countries, there is a distinction between long established members 
of the developed world (e.g. U.S., U.K., Canada, West Germany and France) who exhibit rates 
of return between 5% and 25% per annum, and countries which have reached maturity more 
recently (e.g. Japan and Italy) where rates of return vary around 40-50% per annum. The 
highest rates of return, perhaps in excess of 200% per annum, are to be found in poorer, newly 
industrializing economies, such as South Korea and Chile. In less developed, predominantly 
agricultural, countries, such as India, Pakistan, Kenya and Nigeria, we find rates of return of 
less than 50% a year. These findings suggest that many developing countries, particularly those 
undergoing rapid growth, may be seriously under-capitalized in terms of transportation 
infrastructure. 
Our results also provide an insight into the mechanism through which infrastructure 
benefits an economy. We find strong cross sectional evidence that output levels are positively 
related to the amount of transportation infrastructure in a country, but little time series evidence 
that increases in infrastructure lead to immediate increases in output. We reconcile these results 
by using a dynamic specification which shows that the effect of infrastructure construction on 
output is slow in coming, but long lived. We therefore argue that infrastructure capital should 
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not be regarded as a normal "factor of production" which directly produces output, but as a 
condition for high rates of economic growth. 
Our work is related to Aschauer (1989), who finds road building to have a very large 
effect on economic growth in the U.S., suggesting rates of return of around 200% a year. This 
macroeconomic approach to estimating rates of return is based on the argument that public 
infrastructure may have externalities not captured in cost-benefit analysis. An obvious difficulty 
with the macro-economic approach is the potential endogeneity of infrastructure investment 
flows; if economic growth causes infrastructure investment, the correlation between the two need 
not imply a high marginal product of infrastructure. Aschauer (1990), who focuses on 
transportation infrastructure in the United States, found his results to be robust to corrections 
for this bias. Others who tend to confirm Ashauer's results are Fernald (1992), Duffy-Deno and 
Eberts (1991), and Morrison and Schwartz (1992). 
Hulten and Schwab (1991) and Holtz and Eakin (1992), on the other hand, argue that 
infrastructure has not had a significant impact on growth in the U.S., based on the idea that the 
correlation between infrastructure investment and economic growth is spurious; the decrease in 
productivity growth, and public investment in infrastructure, that followed the 1974 oil shock 
may have had a common cause and need not be directly linked. 
Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. First, we extend the analysis to a wide 
cross section of countries, both developed and developing, to see whether Ashauer's results hold 
for the world as a whole. Most studies have been limited to analyzing the role of infrastructure 
in the US or OECD countries, though Queiroz and Gautam (1992) and Baffes and Shah (1992) 
use data from developing countries. 
Secondly, while attempting to avoid the endogeneity problem, we also address the 
potentially serious issue of omitted variable bias by drawing on the findings of recent empirical 
work about the importance of human capital (Barro (1991); Benhabib and Spiegel, (1992)), 
political stability (Alesina et al., (1992)) and machinery equipment (De Long and Summers, 
(1992)). Also, we allow for country specific intercepts in the regressions to capture any missing 
variables which vary across countries but which are stable over time. Finally, we examine 
whether the high productivity we find for roads could be due to the fact that they proxy for a 
whole class of infrastructure; we test this by introducing measures of telecommunication and 
power infrastructure. 
Despite these precautions, we find transportation networks to have large effects on 
growth rates. We find that doubling a country's road stock leads to roughly 1 % higher growth 
in real GDP per year; this compound growth adds up to an sizable effect on output over a period 
of time. Our estimates for the rate of return to road building vary widely across countries. This 
is due to two factors. Firstly, countries with high levels of income and relatively few roads and 
railways, that is, countries with an infrastructure shortage, have a high marginal product of 
infrastructure. These are mainly the rapidly developing countries. Secondly, construction costs 
for roads vary widely across countries, being higher in developed countries than in poor 
countries, though the relationship appears to be non-linear, with costs being lowest in the newly 
industrializing economies. This may be due to the fact that the newly industrializing economies 
can produce the machinery required for road building locally, while the poorest undeveloped 
countries must rely on imports. 
In the next section we develop a model for estimating the impact of infrastructure on 
output and growth; section 3 discusses the data; section 4 presents the results of the estimation; 
section 5 derives the implied marginal social products and rates of return of transportation 
infrastructure for each country; section 6 analyses the robustness of the results and section 7 
concludes. 
2. Theory 
We begin by postulating a Cobb Douglas production function 
Y = AJC«LP(—)^(~)* (1) 
L D 
where Y is total output, A is total factor productivity, K is physical capital, H/L is human 
capital per worker, and R/D is infrastructure capital R, divided by a suitable deflator D. The 
use of an aggregate production function is viewed as a convenient simplification for the purposes 
of this paper, though the inclusion of the infrastructure stock raises issues of aggregation which 
may be more severe than for other factors, due to the network nature of roads and railways (see 
Hulten (1992)). Taking logs of equation (1), we obtain: 
log(y) = log(i4) 4. alogC^ + piogd) + ylogiH/L) + 61og(^-61og(/>) (!') 
A central issue in growth modeling is whether (!') should be estimated in levels or in 
differences. Estimation in levels implies using a time trend for changes in total factor 
productivity and treating output shocks as transitory. A first difference formulation, on the other 
hand, treats output shocks as random, but permanent. The correct approach would be to study 
the time series properties of the variables and test different specifications (e.g. see Rappoport 
and Reichiin (1989)). This, however, would be difficult to do given our data base, large in 
cross section but comprising only 6 data points, giving 5 time periods (of five years each)'. 
Rather than try to decide this issue in this paper, we prefer to report results from both 
approaches and attempt to reconcile them. 
Estimating (I) with ordinary least squares requires that the right hand side variables be 
exogenous. However, since investment decisions may be based on expected levels of output, 
and labor supply may react to current wages, neither the capital stock nor the labor supply may 
be regarded as exogenous with respect to output shocks^. To address this issue, we also 
estimate equation (V) using, as instruments, factor inputs from the previous period. These 
instruments may again depend on expectations of future output levels, but, if expectations are 
formed based on the same information set as we use in the model, they should be uncorrelated 
with the residuals. 
The alternative approach is to estimate equation (1') in changes, relating growth of output 
with growth of factor inputs, rather than levels. This automatically corrects for the presence of 
unobserved fixed factors in each country, and for cross country variations in total factor 
productivity, since level effects are netted out by differencing. 
Taking log differences of equation (1) we can derive an equation for the growth rate of 
output, ZY: 
2Y = Z4 + aZK^ ^ZL + yZiH/L) + bZ{RiL) (2) 
where Z denotes log differences. 
In order to estimate equation (2), we need to find a proxy for ZA, the rate of growth of 
total factor productivity. We begin by following Nelson and Phelps (1966) in ascribing 
technological change to two factors. First, countries with low initial total factor productivity, 
proxied by low initial income per capita, tend to catch up with other more advanced countries; 
the argument is that taking already developed technology "off the shelf is easier than developing 
new technology. Second, the speed of this catch up, and of the richer countries' new 
technological development, depends on the average education level of the work force; this 
determines how quickly workers can adapt to new technology. Finally, we add infrastructure 
as a possible source of technical progress. The argument for this is that infi^ istructure allows 
access to techniques of production that have fast technological progress. Improved 
communication through an increased transportation network may open up markets, and allow 
for specialization and the use of increasing returns technologies. We argue that this may be the 
main channel through which infrastructure affects growth, rather than as a direct input in the 
production function. 
The rate of growth of technical progress is, therefore: 
ZA = %-^a^\og{j)^a^\o^{-j)-^(i}.o%irj) (3) 
L^ Xrf Xtf 
where we expect z.^ to be negative, as poor countries "catch up" in terms of technology, and aj 
and aj to be positive, since a well educated work force and a well developed infrastructure allow 
faster incorporation of new technologies. Combining (2) and (3) we get the growth equation to 
be estimated: 
ZY =aQ-^a^ log(-) +a2log(—) ^ a^\og{-) + o.ZK^ ^ZL + yZiflJL) + bZ{RIL) (4) 
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There is also an argument that new technology is "embodied" in new capital so that the rate of 
technical progress depends on the rate of investment. However, including a term for capital 
accumulation in equation (3) does not change the model specification, although it may justify a 
high estimated coefficient on capital in equation (4). 
We could estimate (4) directly if it weren't for our concern about the problem of reverse 
causation. Factor accumulation over long periods is endogenous and cannot be regarded as 
exogenous for estimation purposes. For example, suppose that capital accumulation is given by 
investment which is a fixed proportion, s, of income. Now suppose income grows at an annual 
rate g so that Y(t) = Y(0)e''. Integration of the capital accumulation equation yields: 
J32. = 1 . £ rJW _ 1. W) (5) 
K{0) 8 Y{0) K{0) 
so that ZK, the log difference in capital, is determined by the log difference of output, g or ZY; 
the savings rate, s; and the initial capital output ratio: 
ZJC=/ (Zy ,5 , iB . ) (6) 
Letting the investment, or savings, rate depend on average income per capita, and the 
attractiveness of investment, we have: 
s = s ( I , ^ . P/, T) (7) 
L dK 
so that the savings rate depends on the level of income, the marginal product of capital, the log 
of the real price of investment goods, PI, and the tax rate on income from investment. 
Assuming constant returns to scale (a+/3 = 1), the log marginal product of capital is given by: 
log-^ = Iog(a)+ log(^)-plog(4)^Ylog(f )^6Iog(~) (8) 
dK L L L 
Combining equation (6), (7) and (8) and imposing a linear functional form, we have: 
ZK^^b^^ b,ZY + yogC-^) + bjlogC^) + 6^log(f) ^ b,\ogA 
K. LI Lt Lt (9) 
+ b^PI + bfiOV 
where GOV, the share of Government spending in GDP is used as a proxy for the tax rate. 
Equation (9) measures the returns and costs to investing as determinants of investment and 
capital growth. Note, in particular, the presence of our infrastructure measure as a possible 
inducement to invest. The intercept term depends on total factor productivity and should, 
therefore, be estimated separately for each country. 
The rate of growth of the labor force, ZL, must be considered endogenous with respect 
to output shocks, particularly productivity shocks. In principle we can think of ZL as having 
two components, growth in population of working age and growth in the participation rate. If 
migration is relatively small, the change in working age population can be considered 
predetermined, and so exogenous over reasonably short periods of time, even if birth rates are 
endogenous. Participation rates, on the other hand, depend on current wage levels, which are 
certainly endogenous. Modeling changes in the participation rate as a function, h, of the change 
in the wage rate, which we take to be proportional to changes in GDP per worker, we have: 
ZL = ZPOPWA •*• ZPART = ZPOPWA + h{Zi^)) d©) 
If we assume that h is linear we have the following model for ZL: 
ZL = CQ+ C^ZPOPWA + c^{ZY-ZL) dD 
The rate of growth of human capital, ZH, is determined by the education level of those 
leaving the work force and school enrollment rates over the last 15 years, which indicate the 
education levels of those entering the work force. Over a 5 year period both of these are 
predetermined and we can regard ZH as exogenous. In fact, this is the way ZH has been 
calculated (by a perpetual inventory method using 5 year lags) so it can be regarded as truly 
predetermined. 
To complete our simultaneous equation model we require an equation explaining ZR, the 
growth in infrastructure. It turns out to be particularly difficult to find good instruments for 
infrastructure growth. Instead of doing so we begin by leaving ZR in the reduced form 
determining output growth, taking it to be exogenous. If reverse causation is important we 
would expect such an approach to overestimate the effect of transport infrastructure growth on 
output growth. 
Combining equations (4), (9) and (11), we have the following reduced form for growth 
of income per worker: 
2 ( - ) = Cj + e^ZH + ejLPOPWA + e.ZR + c-iog(-) + eJog(^) 
L L L (12) 
+ C7log(y) + eJPI + efiOV 
Ld 
Note that, in principle, we should have two extra terms, log(K/L) and log(Y/K), from the capital 
accumulation equation. In fact, since log(Y/L) is already in the regression, these two terms are 
linearly dependent and we can include at most one. If we do this however, we tend to get a 
high degree of correlation with log(Y/L), and little addition to the explanatory power. We 
prefer to proxy these variables by log(Y/L) rather than add them directly. Note that this implies 
a route of causation for log(Y/L) in addition to that of productivity catchup; it may influence the 
rate of capital accumulation through its correlation with the rate of return on capital. 
As well as the reduced form we can try to estimate the mechanism through which 
infrastructure affects growth. The reduced form simply tells us how much infrastructure affects 
growth, but not if it works directly on productivity or through a crowding in of capital. To 
separate these effects we need to estimate equation (4) directly to find the productivity effect of 
infrastructure, net of induced factor accumulation. 
3. The Data 
Our data set is a panel of 96 countries for the period 1960-1985 taken at 5-year intervals. 
A detailed description of all the variables used, as well as their sources appears in appendix I. 
(i) GDP, human and physical capital measures: 
Our GDP measures are from Summers and Heston (1991) and are calculated in constant 
1985 international dollars. The physical capital measures were constructed by Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1992) from Summers and Heston (1991) data on investment and capital, using a 
perpetual inventory method. Since their estimates only go back to 1965, we followed the same 
methodology to extrapolate back to 1960. The human capital variable, which measures the 
average years of education of the population of working age, is from Benhabib and Spiegel, and 
Barro and Lee (1992), constructed as a function of lagged school enrollment rates, calibrated 
to fit survey data on education levels. 
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(ii) Transportation infrastructure: 
Our measure of physical infrastructure is an aggregate of kilometers of paved roads and 
railway lines. They were added up into a single variable, since they appear to be substitutes, 
providing the same type of transportation service: estimation of the growth equations with the 
two variables separately could not reject the hypothesis of equal coefficient, although railways 
always exhibited a very high standard error. This is due to the fact that few countries (around 
1/3 of the sample) actually have railways and these railway stocks tend to change very little over 
time (though there is a tendency toward reduction in track length in almost every country) .^ 
The data on roads and rail that we obtained from a variety of sources suffered from the 
problem that measurement can vary across countries and over time. Our use of paved, rather 
than total roads was an attempt to alleviate this problem: while the definition of an "unpaved 
road" appears to vary enormously, paved road data move fairly consistently, rising steadily over 
time in almost all countries, and are closely related to GDP levels across countries,'* The 
relationship between transportation infrastructure and other variables is described by the 
regression: 
TRANS = -8.782 + L171 YLO +0.942 LO +0.037 LAREA -3 .350 OILRAT 
(0.442)** (0.037) •« (0.035)** (0.031) (0.649)** 
iV=372 JR2=0.875 R^=0.874 
where TRANS is the log of the network length; YLO, the log of GDP per worker; LO, the log 
work force; OILRAT, the proportion of GDP from oil production; LAREA, the log of effective 
area^ Standard errors are in parenthesis and *(**) indicates significance at the 5%(1 %) level. 
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This regression implies that the size of the infrastructure network is not significantly affected 
by land area, but increases almost proportionately with total income. 
Even if network length is accurately measured, roads and railways in different countries 
may well be of different qualities. The number of lanes that make up a road, or the number of 
tracks in a rail line, can differ as can the degree of maintenance of the network (Queiroz and 
Gautam (1992)), and we should, in principle, use a quality adjusted measure of network length 
and this should also be taken into account. Instead, we rely on our log specification and fixed 
effects formulation. Suppose each country, i, measures its network length at time t as Rj„ and 
Rit = a,R,* 
where Rj,* is the true, quality adjusted, network length and ai is a country specific measurement 
coefficient. If the composition and quality of the infrastructure network is constant over time, 
i.e. a^  is constant over time, we have a proportional measure of the true infrastructure level 
which is consistent over time in each country. Taking logs will then imply that any systematic 
difference in measurement across countries will appear as a separate log linear effect, captured 
in the country specific constant, and allows us to obtain consistent estimates of the true 
infrastructure effect. This, however, only applies when we use country specific intercepts; with 
a common intercept, measurement and quality differences across countries remain in the data. 
To measure the flow of transportation services provided by roads and railways, we 
require a suitable deflator for the stock of infrastructure. If it is a pure public good, non rivsd 
and non excludable, each agent has access to the entire stock and we need not deflate. If it is 
rival and excludable, the appropriate deflator is the labor force, as each worker gets his share. 
However since road services are generally non-excludable, and congestion may be proportional 
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to the degree of economic activity, total output might be considered the appropriate deflator. 
If there is no congestion, but agents want access to particular locations, network length should 
be divided by some function of the country's land area. In addition, the proper deflator may 
differ across countries at different levels of development: access to locations may be the 
constraint in poor countries, implying that area is the proper deflator, while congestion might 
be the problem relevant to more developed countries. 
Given our log specification, the choice of labor or output as the deflator does not affect 
the coefficient on transport infrastructure; it will already appear as a separate log hnear effect 
in the regression. In the regressions with country specific intercepts even using area as a 
deflator has no effect on the regression coefficient since area can be thought of as a country 
specific fixed effect. After some experimentation we settled on labor force for ease of 
interpretation; other deflators yielded very similar, and in many cases identical, results. 
Our price data on the cost of construction comes from Summers and Heston (1988) who 
provide the price in local currency of a unit of road construction in 1985 for a sample of 
"benchmark" countries. This main body of data is supplemented by some data from the OECD 
for a few developed countries not in the benchmark sample. The average annual exchange rate 
for the year to convert local currency costs to dollar costs, yielding an index of the relative cost 
of construction of roads across countries. Bennathan (1992) estimates the cost of a kilometer 
of road construction in Indonesia, in 1985, to be around $200,000 per kilometer and we use this 
to calibrate cost. 
One problem with this data are that in some countries the official exchange rate is 
overvalued, and so while it may be a good guide to the costs to an international agency 
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promoting road building, it may not be a good indicator of domestic opportunity costs. A 
second problem, is that, in countries undergoing rapid inflation, any misalignment, even of a 
few months, of the date of the local cost calculation, and the exchange rate we use for the year, 
is likely to produce a very large error in our estimate of real costs. In particular, inflation 
seems to cause problems in our data for countries in Latin America, which have real cost 
estimates that are very high relative to other developing countries. Another issue, not dealt with 
here, is the assumption that the roads built do not deteriorate. The cost of a road should include 
the net present value of the required maintenance costs^ , as well as construction costs. 
These issues suggest that our cost data should be used with caution. 
(iii) Auxiliary variables: 
In our estimation, we added some auxiliary variables to proxy for variations in total 
factor productivity across countries and over time. These variables may also indirectly affect 
capital accumulation through their effects on productivity and income. There are three broad 
classes of factors. First, natural endowments may affect growth of income and are not included 
in our equations. Second, sectoral composition may have an influence on total factor 
productivity. Third, there is the issue of political stability and its effect on the efficient 
allocation of resources and the level of investment. 
To address the first problem, we include a term to correct for the proportion of GDP, 
or of GDP growth, that is derived from oil production. Oil is not the only natural endowment 
that should be considered but the volatility in oil prices and output has had a very large effect 
on measured GDP growth in many countries. The basic argument for including oil production 
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is that it represents a natural endowment which causes output, and growth, independently of our 
production function. In our levels regression we include a term for the proportion of oil to non-
oil GDP, while in our growth equation we include a measure of the percentage of GDP growth 
derived from changes in the value of oil production. 
There is also an argument for the growth regression to include a measure of the 
percentage of initial GDP derived from oil production, since it affects initial income per capita, 
our proxy for the "catch up" effect by less developed countries. If a country has a high GDP 
per capita due to oil revenues, we should not regard this as a "developed" country but rather 
take its GDP per capita net of oil as the real measure of its level of technology. We therefore 
expect the proportion of oil in GDP to have a positive coefficient in a growth equation. 
As a proxy for political stability, we use HOM, a measure of the percentage of the 
population in the largest common language-race-religion group in 1960. The idea behind this 
proxy is that less homogeneous societies have greater political tensions, which are reflected in 
greater political instability and a less efficient use of resources. Other studies, such as Barro 
(1991) have used measures of political instability over the period, but this has the problem that 
they may be endogenous. Indeed, Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1992) present empirical 
evidence that political instability is endogenous. Given our emphasis on avoiding reverse 
causation we prefer to use a predetermined proxy rather than the actual occurrence of political 
instability. 
Since the sectoral composition of the economy may affect total factor productivity, we 
also add GOV and IND which measure, respectively, the size of Government consumption as 
a percentage of GDP and the percentage of the labor force in the industrial sector. In the 
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reduced form equation, GOV is also a proxy for the tax rate. 
We have of course the problem that our equations are pure supply side equations and 
ignore variations in output caused by demand side fluctuations, e.g. business cycle effects. 
These demand side effects might be "noise" in our supply side regressions, yet this noise may 
not serially independent. We therefore include LZYT, the lagged value of growth of output, 
as an explanatory variable. This has two uses. In regressions without fixed effects, it captures 
omitted variables which are conducive to growth and might lead to high future growth rates. 
Once we add fixed effects, this justification of LZYT disappears and it becomes a means of 
capturing cyclical variation. 
Finally, time dummies are included in the regressions as proxy for changes in total factor 
productivity due to world wide technology shocks, though they may also proxy for world 
demand side shocks. 
4. Results. 
(i) Infrastructure and Output. 
Our panel data, in levels, consists of 96 countries and 6 data points, 1960, 1965, 1970, 
1975, 1980 and 1985. We begin by estimating equation (T) first using ordinary least squares, 
then by two stage least squares to allow for the potential endogeneity of the right hand side 
variables. To try to control for omitted variable bias we use a fixed effects approach as well 
as the common intercept model. In all our regressions we report heteroskedastic robust standard 
errors (White, 1980), since there is no presumption that the error has common variance across 
countries^. 
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The dependent variable in the regressions reported in Table 1 is the log of real GDP. 
Regression 1 estimates the production function with a common intercept across countries, and 
so assumes no hidden factors or differences in productivity levels across countries. 
Transportation infrastructure exhibits a coefficient that is statistically significant and suggests that 
a 10% increase in the level of infrastructure would raise output by approximately 1 % per year. 
Both physical capital and labor are significant inputs but human capital does not seem to 
matter very much, if at all. Countries with larger industrial sectors , as measured by IND, 
appear to have higher total factor productivity while those with larger Government sectors, as 
measured by GOV, tend to have lower total factor productivity. Homogeneity of the population 
has a significantly positive influence on productivity while oil revenues have no apparent effect. 
In regressions 2, we repeat regression I but allow each country to have its own intercept, 
hence its own level of total factor productivity. The introduction of country specific effects 
requires us to drop the homogeneity measure which does not vary over time. In fact, the major 
drawback of fixed effects models is that it precludes estimation of the effects of fixed or slow 
moving variables*. However, it overcomes, to some extent, the problem of omitted variable 
bias discussed by Levine and Renelt (1991). 
A Wald test for the hypothesis that all the intercept terms are in fact the same in 
regression 2 (with the inclusion of homogeneity factor), rejects this hypothesis at the 1 % level". 
After the introduction of fixed effects, the coefficient on transportation infrastructure in 
regression 2 becomes very close to zero. There are two possible explanations for this. First, 
rail and roads, like homogeneity, may vary greatly across countries but not within countries, 
over time; the country dummies added to the time dummies explain both variables fairly well 
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and the negative results may simply be due to multicoUinearity. Alternatively, it may be that 
omitted country specific variables, that are correlated with the infrastructure stocks, are the real 
causal factors. From these regressions we can only say the evidence for a large infrastructure 
marginal productivity is inconclusive. 
In regressions 3 and 4, we use two stage least squares, using as instruments the one 
period lag of capital, labor, participation rate, transport infrastructure, and current population 
of working age. We entered the lagged value of GOV and IND directly in the regression, since 
that allowed us to include on more time period in the estimation^°. We do not instrument 
human capital since, as explained earlier, it is predetermined by construction. 
In regression 3, without fixed effects, transportation infrastructure again has a statistically 
significant positive coefficient, although the estimated size of the coefficient, at 0.07, is smaller 
than under OLS. It is not robust to the introduction of fixed effects in regression 4, although 
the size of the estimated coefficient is now consistent with that estimated without the fixed 
effects. 
(ii) Infrastructure and Growth: Reduced form Estimates. 
For the growth rate equations, our panel sample consists of 97 countries and 5 time 
periods 1960-65, 1965-70, 1970-75, 1975-80 and 1980-85. Growth rates are measured as log 
differences and converted into average annual percentage growth rates. All level variables are 
measured in the initial year of the period. Regression 5 and 6 introduce infrastructure in 
changes (ZTRANS), which is the correct specification if one believes that infrastructure enters 
as a direct input in the production function. Regressions 7 and 8 use infrastructure in levels, 
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thereby testing the hypothesis that its main role is through promoting total factor productivity 
growth. 
The results suggest that the role of infrastructure is in fact through the second channel; 
while the coefficients on ZTRANS are never statistically different from zero, the level of 
infrastructure at the beginning of the period appears to be statistically significant when the fixed 
effect model is used. The improvement brought to the performance of the infrastructure 
variables by the introduction of fixed effects suggests that these correct for differences in the 
quality of inft-astructure across countries. Alternatively, it may be that fixed effects help us 
capture the proper deflator. 
The coefficient on lagged growth behaves as expected although it is never more than 
marginally significant. In regressions 5 and 7 without fixed effects, it exhibits a positive 
coefficient as it proxies for omitted variables which are conducive to persistence in growth, 
whereas when fixed effects are included it becomes negative as it cs^tures cyclical variations." 
One of the proxies for capital growth is PI the log price of investment goods in the 
country relative to world average prices. As expected this has a negative coefficient and is 
statistically significant in the fixed effects model. 
Labor force growth, proxied here by ZWA, the growth of working age population, 
appears to have no significant effect on per capita output growth. This is borne out if we rerun 
the regressions in Table 2 using total output growth, as the dependent variable. In this case the 
coefficient on ZWA is close to one and statistically significant. 
Homogeneity of the population (HOM) does appear to have a significant positive effect 
on productivity growth. Many African countries have homogeneity of around 10% while South 
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Korea, at the other end of the scale, has 100% homogeneity. Regression 7 suggests this may 
explain an advantage of about 1.5% productivity growth per annum in South Korea. 
Both education variables appear to be strongly affected by the introduction of the fixed 
effect as shown by a comparison between regression 7 and 8. The level and the growth rate of 
education per capita appear to have a significantly positive effect on growth rates when the fixed 
effects are omitted, but change sign when these are included. This suggests that the reported 
positive influence of education on growth found in cross section models (e.g. Barro 1991) could 
be a spurious correlation, caused by countries having particular, fixed, features which produce 
both higher output and higher education levels. A more plausible explanation may be that while 
education levels vary greatly between countries there is little variation within a country over 
time. In fact, a regression of education levels on the time and country dummies produces an 
R^  of over 0.7. Initial GDP per capita exhibits a negative coefficient in our growth equation, 
supporting the argument that poorer countries tend to catch up. However, there is no evidence 
of a narrowing of the gap between rich and poor countries indicating that richer countries can 
stay ahead because of growth inducing factors, such as education levels. In fact once fixed 
effects are included, the negative effect of YLO becomes much more pronounced, suggesting the 
existence of country specific factors counterbalancing the catch up effect. 
ZOIL, the growth of oil revenues, is consistently positive and significant while OILRAT, 
the percentage of GDP derived from oil prcxluction, becomes significant only when fixed effects 
are included. Regression 8 suggests that getting an increase in oil revenues equivalent to 1 % 
of GDP causes more than 1% of economic growth (in fact around 1.7%) while a country with 
10% of its GDP coming from oil is expected to grow around 2% faster than otherwise expected. 
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ceteris paribus. 
GOV and IND are at best only marginally statistically significant, although of the 
expected sign. However, the degree of industrialization (IND) appears to have a very large 
effect on growth rates in the fixed effects model. A country increasing the share of its labor 
force that is employed in the industrial sector from 20% to 50% can expect to raise its growth 
rate by around 5% of GDP per year. This may be one of the offsetting factors to the decline 
in growth with income per capita; highly industrialized countries tend to have a high GDP per 
capita and the two factors have offsetting effects on economic growth. The role of 
industrialization in growth is examined in more detail in Canning (1993). 
Finally, when fixed effects are omitted the period dummies point to a pattern of declining 
productivity growth rates over time; annual productivity growth rates in the period 1970-1985 
being on average around 2-3 percentage points lower than 1960-1970. This is consistent with 
a picture of falling productivity and output growth due to the oil shocks and the debt crisis. This 
pattern disappears in regressions 6 and 8, when fixed effects are included. In effect, in 
regressions 5 and 7 the productivity growth slowdown over the period 1960-1985 is explained 
by the time dummies which proxy for unobserved worldwide shocks. In regression 6 and 8 the 
slowdown is attributed to the growth of education and income levels. While this interpretation 
is consistent with the evidence ~ education and income levels have indeed been rising 
consistently while growth has been slowing ~ it is probably a simple spurious correlation, which 
will disappear if growth picks up in the future. 
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(iii) Infrastructure and Growth: Sunultaneous Equation Estimation. 
The marginal productivity of infrastructure must be derived from the production function 
and not from the reduced form, since not all the growth effect it induces can be counted as a net 
gain to the economy. While infrastructure might influence growth also by encouraging 
investment, this should not be counted as a welfare gain. Baldwin (1992) shows this formally; 
if capital markets are perfect the induced capital formation has a marginal product which equals 
its marginal cost and, by the envelope theorem, the net welfare effect of (small) changes in 
capital formation is zero. This of course does not hold for large induced changes in capital 
formation, or if there is a significant wedge between the marginal social product of capital and 
its marginal social cost which is not reflected in private benefits and costs. While these caveats 
may be significant we prefer to err on the side of caution and only count the gains to output 
which come net of induced factor inputs as the return to infrastructure. 
In Table 3, we estimate the structural equation for growth, equation (4), directly. 
Regressions 9 and 10 use simple OLS while regressions 11 and 12 use a two stage least squares 
approach, instrumenting the endogenous variables, ZK and ZL. The instruments we use are 
growth in the population of working age, the price of investment, lagged GDP growth, and the 
initial output/capital ratio. The two stage least squares approach is in theory better, given the 
endogenous nature of the factor input growth rates, and should yield consistent parameter 
estimates. However, it is clear from the coefficients on ZK and ZL that our instruments may 
not be doing a very good job in the fixed effects model. The problem is that in 2SLS the 
instrument set includes all the exogenous variables. In our case this includes the country and 
time dummies. While these give a good fit to ZK and ZL tlie resulting instrumented variables 
22 
are very collinear with the existing variables in the regression, resulting in poorly determined 
coefficients and high standard errors. The OLS estimates are unlikely to bias the transportation 
coefficient upwards and give more plausible coefficient estimates on ZK and ZL. A regression 
using a reduced set of instruments for ZK and ZL (excluding the country dummies) produced 
a similar estimate, around 1.34, for the coefficient on transportation and has more reasonable 
estimates of at and ^, 
5. Interpretation of our Infrastructure Results. 
(i) The Size of the Infrastructure Effect. 
In regression 3, in levels, we estimate the elasticity of output with respect to 
transportation infrastructure to be around 0.07 in a Cobb Douglas specification, implying a 
marginal product of a kilometer of infrastructure of 0.07 Y/R for each country, where Y/R is 
the ratio of output to kilometers of roads and rail. 
The coefficient on infrastructure estimated in the structural growth regressions 10 and 12 
is no longer an elasticity measure since it relates the initial level of infrastructure with the 
growth of output. To obtain the relevant elasticity measure, from which to derive a marginal 
product, we need to rewrite the growth equation in regression 12 as an equation which 
determines period t output in terms of initial output and the exogenous variables. To find the 
net present value of an extra kilometer of road we need to calculate: 
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Taking a social discount rate of 20%, which seems conservatively high, we get 6 = 1/1.2 = 
0.83, and the net present value of the infinite stream of extra output thus generated is 0.42 Y/R 
of initial GDP. This is equivalent, again using a 20% discount rate, to a return to a kilometer 
of road of 0.0695 Y/R per year, which is surprisingly close to the 0.07 figure we find from the 
levels specification. This estimated elasticity is used to calculate the marginal productivity of 
a kilometer transportation infrastructure shown in Table 7. We multiply 0.0695 by the value 
of Y/R, the ratio of GDP to infrastructure stock measured in kilometers, for each country, in 
1985. Dividing these marginal products by the cost of construction of a kilometer of road gives 
the social rate of return to road construction in each countries. 
The results, reported in Table 4, show sharp differences across countries, both in the 
marginal product of roads and the cost of construction. Developed countries, such as the U.S.A. 
and West Germany, tend to have the lowest marginal product per kilometer of road, between 
$50,000 and $100,000 per annum, and the highest cost of construction, around $500,000 per 
kilometer, giving rates of return in the 10-20% per annum range. In countries which have 
reached maturity more recently, such as Js^an and Spain, tiie marginal product is much higher, 
around $300,000 per year, while construction costs are slightiy lower than in the established 
developed world, giving rates of return around 50% a year. Countries undergoing 
industrialization, such as Korea and Chile, have marginal products of roads similar to the 
recently developed countries but can have much lower cost of construction, as litUe as $100,000 
per kilometer, giving exceptionally high rates of return, perhaps as much as 300% a year. In 
underdeveloped, predominantiy agricultural countries, such as India and Zambia, costs of 
construction are also very low but the marginal product is also low giving rates of return again 
around 50% a year. 
The result for Hong Kong gives an incredibly high rate of return for roads of almost 
1000% per year. While we would expect a high figure, due to Hong Kong's position as a 
rapidly industrizdizing country, the marginal product of roads may be over estimated; Hong 
Kong is a city-state which may have less requirement for transportation infrastructure. In 
addition, construction costs may not adequately reflect the price of land purchases which are 
necessary for road building. 
The rates of return are the relevant ones to a social planner maximizing world average 
income per capita. If he is able to shift dollars between countries at the prevailing exchange rate 
he should concentrate his efforts in those countries with the highest rates of return. 
(ii) The Nature of the Infrastructure Effect. 
The regressions in Table 2 suggest that infrastructure building has little immediate effect 
on output, but rather that the level of infrastructure affects tiie growth rate. This is consistent 
with the results in Table 1. In regressions 1 and 3 we essentially ask whether there is cross 
sectional evidence that infrastructure is productive. The answer is tiiat indeed, countries witii 
larger infrastructure networks have higher levels of output. Once we add the fixed effects in 
regressions 2 and 4, the question is subtly different. The estimate of a coefficient i3 in a fixed 
effects is equivalent to estimating /8 in the regression 
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where the barred variables refer to the average over time of the variable for each country i. 
Thus, in the fixed effects model in table 1 we essentially ask the question, if a country increases 
its network lengtii, above its average level, will it tend to have output above its average level? 
We are looking for within country, time series, evidence of the impact of infrastructure. As we 
can see from regression 6, in Table 2, the predicted effect of new infrastructure on the level of 
output is very small in the short run. Therefore the negative results in regressions 2 and 4 are 
not surprising; there is no immediate effect of road building on output levels. 
An increase in the infrastructure network has litde short run effect on output; however, 
a high level of infrastructure allows for increased productivity growth, leading to higher output 
in the long run. The positive result in regressions 1 and 3 can be interpreted as a vintage effect; 
new infrastructure has litUe effect on current output but the older infrastructure will have caused 
growUi in the past and be associated with higher current output. If roads have an average age 
of around 10 years then the growth effects should average out to an effect on output around tiiat 
found in regression 1. We therefore argue that infrastructure networks do not act as a normal 
"factor of production", inputs of which produce output immediately. 
6. Robustness of the Results. 
The key question is whether or not we can use the above result to advocate a policy of 
increasing investment in these infrastructure networks. While there appears to be a case for 
doing so, two important points need to be made. 
First, the growth effects of infrastructure we calculate are averages over a cross section 
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of countries at different points in time. For policy purposes, we would need to know if these 
results apply to the country in question. At the very least, we need to verify that our results are 
robust across sub-samples and whether the effectiveness of infrastructure varies at different 
levels of income or development. We carry out this test below. 
Second, the transportation infrastructure we employ may act as a proxy for a more 
general class of infrastructure. Our results would then suggest that infrastructure as a whole is 
productive but the rate of return to transportation is not necessarily very high; it may be 
necessary to increase a broad group of infrastructure networks to achieve the estimated effect 
on output. To test this possibility we try adding two -other types of infrastructure to our 
regressions, telecommunications and electricity. We measure these as telephones per worker 
and electricity generating capacity per worker. 
To test for stability of the results we reran regression 8 on three separate samples made 
of low income countries, middle income countries and high income countries'^ . The results 
are reported in Table 5, with low income countries are defined as those with Summers and 
Heston real GDP per capita of less than ICP$1000 in 1960, middle income as those between 
ICPS 1000 and ICP$2000, and high income as tfiose above ICP$2000. Table 6 lists the 
countries figuring in each category. We first performed a Wald test of parameter equality across 
the sub-samples. The test statistic was 123.6 with 22 degrees of freedom, implying that we can 
reject the hypothesis of equality of the coefficient at the 1 % confidence level. As Table 5 makes 
clear, however, this rejection appears to be mainly due to the different effects of the oil variables 
at different levels of income. While the coefficient on infrastructure appears to increase with 
the level of income, the differences are not large compared to the standard errors. We cannot 
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reject the hypothesis of equality of the coefficient on infrastructure: the Wald test give a chi-
squared of 0.72 with 2 degrees of freedom, which is well below the 95% critical value. 
The results of Table 5 for suggest that the effect of infrastructure may be strongest in 
middle and high income countries and less pronounced in low income countries. This might lead 
us to suspect that the rates of return in the poorest countries, such as India and Pakistan, is 
somewhat lower than the figures we have reported. However, attempts to include an interactive 
term, allowing the infrastructure effect to vary with income level, did not produce significant 
results for a regression involving the whole sample. 
Table 7 reports results from adding electricity generating capacity per worker and 
telephones per worker to the reduced form specification of regressions 7 and 8. Regression 16, 
which excludes fixed effect shows the effect of roads and rail to become negative, while only 
telephones have a positive and significant effect on output growth. However, in regression 17, 
with fixed effects, only transportation infrastructure is positive and significant. Further, its 
coefficient and standard error appear to be completely unaffected by the introduction of other 
types of infrastructure and smaller sample size caused by the introduction of variables for which 
we had a smaller coverage, and remain remarkably similar to die ones found in regression 8. 
7. Conclusion. 
We conclude that there is evidence that the rate of return to transportation infrastructure is very 
high in middle income countries that are undergoing rapid development. It is roughly equal to 
a normal rate of return on capital for mature developed economies, indicating that they have the 
approxiamtely the "right" amount of infrastructure. For slow growing underveloped countries 
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the results suggest at best moderate rates of return. The effect of infiastructure appears to be 
slow in coming but long lived: it has litUe short run impact but leads to a higher growth rate, 
and higher output, in the long run. This result seems robust across countries of different income 
levels and to the inclusion of other types infrastructure capital. 
The question we leave unanswered is why infrastructure is so productive. It appears to 
work through increasing the growth of total factor productivity but this could be due to many 
reasons. For example, if transportation enlarges the size of the market, firms may be able to 
exploit increasing returns to scale, and larger markets may allow the fixed costs of innovation 
to be spread more widely. Larger market areas may also increase the degrees of competition. 
While this story seems plausible for developing countries, for developed countries road building 
tends to reduce transportation and congestion costs marginally ratiier than opening up completely 
new areas, which may be the explanation for die very different marginal productivities of 
infrastructure. This question can only be examined with much more disaggregated than we use 
here. 
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DATA DEFINITION AND SOURCES 
ZY: Annual average percentage growth of GDP. Calculated as the log difference of 
GDP in constant ICE dollars. Source: Summers and Heston (1991). 
LZYT: Lagged value of ZY. 
ZYL: Annual average percentage growth of GDP per work. Calculated as the log 
difference of GDP per worker. Source (GDP): Summers and Heston (1991); 
Source (labor force): The Worid Bank, Worid Tables. 
LZYL: Ugged value of ZYL. 
ZL: Annual average percentage growth of the labor force, calculated in log 
differences. Source: The World Bank, World Tables. 
ZWA: Annual average rate of growth of the population of working age. Source: The 
World Bank. 
ZK: Annual average percentage growtii of die physical capital stock, calculated in log 
differences. Physical capital stock source: Benhabib and Spiegel (1992). 
ZH: Annual average percentage growth of the human capital stock per worker, 
calculated in log differences. Human capital stock per worker is the average 
years of education of tiie population of working age. Sources: Benhabib and 
Spiegel, (1992); Barro and Lee (1992); 
HO: Log of initial level of human capital. Sources: same as above. 
YLO: Log of initial output-labor ratio. Source for GDP: Summers and Heston (1991); 
source for labor force: The World Bank, Worid Tables. 
PI: Log Initial price of investment. Source: Summers and Heston (1991). 
OIL: Log of 1 plus the proportion of oil to non-oil GDP. Letting total output, Y, be 
made up of produced goods, Q, and of the value of oil, VOIL, we write: 
log(10 = logiQ^VOIL) 
= log«?) + log(U ^^^^ ) c\^f 6\ Y-VOIL 
= log(? + OIL 




Summers and Heston (1991) 
Annual average increase in oil revenues, expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Again letting Y = Q + VOIL we have: 
logiY,) - iog(yy 
VOIL, VOIL, 
= logCg,) - log((?o) + log(lH-„ ,_l ) - log(U 2, ) 
Fi-FO/I, Yo-VOIL, 
= ZQ ^ ZOIL 
where the subscript one refers to final year and zero refers to initial year. It 
should be noted tiiat our theoretical measure of ZOIL includes a term in Y|, the 
final year output level of GDP, which is clearly endogenous with ZY. To avoid 
this problem we proxy Y, in ZOIL by YQ SO that ZOIL can be tiiought of as the 
expedited contribution of oil revenues to growth if there were no other source of 
growth. Source: same as above. 
Initial level of oil revenues expressed as a percentage of GDP: 
OILRAT = i ^ 
Source: same as above. 
HOM: Index of the homogeneity of the population. Measures the percentage of the 
population accounted for by the largest common ethnic, language and religious 
group. Source: Kurian (1984). 
IND: Percentage of the labor force employed in the industrial sector. Source: The 
World Bank, World Tables. 
GOV: Government consumption, expressed as a share of GDP. Source: Summers and 
Heston (1991). 
TRANSL: Log of the length, in kilometers, of paved roads and railways per worker. 
Sources for roads: International Road Federation (various years), Kurian (1984), 
United Nations Annual Bulletin of Transport Statistics for Europe, and Statistical 
Yearbooks (various years). Sources for railroads: The Economist (1982), 
Mitchell (1978a,b,c), United Nations Statistical Yearbooks (various years), The 
World Bank (unpublished country studies). 
ZTRANS: Annual average percentage growth of TRANS. 
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TELL: Log of initial number of telephones per thousand workers. Sources: ATT 
(various issues), International Telecommunication Union (various years). 
EGCL: Log electricity generating capacity, per worker. Source: United Nations, Energy 
Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
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1. While difficult, it is possible, provided we assume that each country follows the same 
process, the process has a short lag length, and the errors are not too correlated across countries, 
so we can think of each has giving an independent observation of the process. 
2. Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze (1966) argue that in a production function specification such as 
ours the apparent endogeneity of the inputs causes no bias in parameter estimates since inputs 
are chosen prior to the output being determined. Provided the agents in the model have no 
informational advantage over the econometrician, their estimate of the productivity shock should 
not be better than his and their choice of input level should therefore be uncorrelated with tiie 
residual from the estimated equation — the requirement for consistent parameter estimation. In 
other words, the predetermined input levels, while tiiey depend on expectations of output levels, 
add no information not already in the model, and, if they are not causal, will have zero 
coefficients. 
This argument depends crucially on agents not having any informational advantage over 
the econometrician about the current shock to GDP. Leaving aside the problem that the model 
may omit relevant explanatory variables, this condition obviously depends on the time period 
being considered. On monthly, or even yearly, data, we might tiiink of inputs as predetermined, 
but with our five year data agents clearly have time to react to persistent shocks which occur 
early within the 5 year time period. 
3. The form 
log(/{CMD+p/M/I)=log(/2a4D)+log(l+-8^^) 
suggests that if we run a regression on log roads, and log of 1 + rail over road, the coefficient 
on the latter should be bigger than the former if jS > 1. In fact the two coefficients turn out to 
be very similar and we therefore assume that j3 is one. 
4. Although unpaved roads are not well measured they may still be important. In particular, 
some African countries, during the early 1960's, had no paved roads and relied totally on 
unpaved roads. We therefore added 5 % of the unpaved road stock to paved roads in our measure 
of transportation infrastructure (which implies giving an unpaved roads l/20th of the effect of 
a paved road). This is an arbitrary adjustment; using 0% or 10% of unpaved roads doesn't 
materially affect our results. 
5. Effective area is defined as land area minus designated wilderness areas. 
6. Data for tiie U.S. suggests a figure of around 2% for the ratio of annual maintenance costs 
to construction costs. 
7. Canning (1993) shows that in models such as those used here we can reject the hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity at very high confidence levels. 
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8. One way of avoiding this problem is to adopt a random effect model, which assumes tiie 
country specific effects are random variables uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. 
We opted in favor of the fixed effects since tiiis latter assumption is in direct contradiction with 
our interpretation of country specific effects as proxies for missing exogenous variables and 
errors in measurement -which are certainly correlated with other explanatory variables, such 
as initial income. 
9. A Wald test can be made to be robust to heteroskedasticity, while an F-test -the more 
traditional way of testing this type of hypothesis— cannot (Greene, 1992). 
10. When running the regressions using simple OLS, the data covered tiie years 1960, 1965, 
1970, 1975, 1980. Moving to 2SLS and using lagged values of the independent variables 
required us to drop 1960, since we were missing 1955 variables for some of the independents. 
Introducing lagged values of IND -for which we did not have 1985 values- directiy in the 
regressions allowed us to use 1985 data, and limit the data loss. The 2SLS regressions were 
then estimated using data for 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985. 
11. While these is no problem with using lagged variables without fixed effect, with fixed effect 
the coefficient estimates on lagged dependent variables become biased in panels with few time 
periods (see Hsiao(1986)). It is for this reason we use lagged total growth when lagged growth 
per capita is the dependent variable in table 2, and vice versa in table 3. 
12. Durlauf and Johnson (1992) investigate the optimal way to split countries into income 
groups; here we simply use arbitrary cutoffs for initial income levels in each income group. 
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TABLE 1: ESTIMATING THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION (LEVELS) 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE: 
Method of estimation 
CONSTANT 
LOGK 
(Log physical capital) 
LOGL 
(log labor force) 
LOGH 
Log GDP 
(Log human capital per worker) 
OIL 
(Contribution of oil to GDP) 
IND 
(% workforce in industry) 































































































- 0 . 0 4 9 
(0.063) 
- 0 . 0 7 3 
(0.062) 
- 0 . 0 7 0 
(0.063) 


































GOV and IND were lagged one period in regressions 5 and 6. 
Standard error in parenthesis. * (**) indicate significance at the 5% (1%) level. 
TABLE 2: REDUCED FORM ESTIMATION 
DEPENDENT VARlABLE:Annuai average growth of GOP per worker 
Method of estimation 
CONSTANT 
LZYT 
(Lagged GDP growth) 
PI 
(Initial Price of Investment) 
ZWA 




(Growth of human capital, per worker) 
HO 
(Log initial human capital, per worker) 
YLO 
(log initial output-labor ratio) 
ZOIL 
(Qrowtti in oil revenues, share of GDP) 
OILRAT 
(Initial oil revenues, % GDP) 
GOV 
(Government consumptton, % GDP) 
IND 
(Initial % of the workforce in industry) 
ZTRANS 
(Growth of roads and railways) 
TRANSL 
































































































































































Standard errors in parenthesis. *(**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level. 
TABLE 3: ESTIMATING THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE: Annual Average GDP Growth 
Method of estimation 
CONSTANT 
LZYL 
(Lagged GDP growth, per worker) 
ZK 
(Growth of physical capital) 
ZL 
(Labor force growth) 
ZH 
(Growth of human capital, per worker) 
HO 
(Log initial human capital, per worker) 
YLO 
(Log initial output-labor ratio) 
ZOIL 
(Growth in oil revenues, share of GDP) 
OILRAT 
(Initial oil revenues, % GDP) 
IND 
(Initial % of the workforce in industry) 
GOV 




































































































































































Standard error in parenthesis. *(**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level. 
TABLE 4: MARGINAL PRODUCT OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
1 2 
Marginal product Price of Roads 
(Dollar Per Km) (1985 dollars per Km) 
3 
Rate of return (%) 













































































































































1 2 3 
Table 4, cont'd Marginal product Price of Roads Rate of return (%) 
(Dollar Per Km) (1985 dollars per Km) (col. 1 / col. 2) 
Jordan 128.226 
Kenya 155,338 285,128 0.54 
Korea, Republic of 469,528 92,072 5.10 
Lesotho 292,168 






Morocco 117,534 270,454 0.43 
Mozambique 160,525 
Netherlands. The 116,927 529,989 0.22 
New Zealand 46,927 456,604 0.10 
Niger 86,566 
Nigeria 245,966 426,839 0.58 
Norway 72,490 438.496 0.17 
Pakistan 141,253 434,650 0.32 
Panama 187,551 
Philippines 342.439 111,343 3.08 
Portugal 236,770 
Rwanda 555.365 
Saudi Arabia 276,732 
Senegal 144.106 306,742 0.47 
Singapore 764,972 
South Africa 195,827 
Spain 97,246 236,990 0.41 
Sri Lanka 73.123 65,277 1.12 
Sunname 50.073 
Swaziland 190,115 
Sweden 78,018 522.244 0.15 
Switzerland 92.054 
Tanzania 233.986 221,723 1.06 
Thailand 306,617 
Togo 91,415 
Tunisia 113,642 313,404 0.36 
Turkey 228,506 
Uganda 113,435 
United Kingdom 121,839 777,133 0.16 
United States 51.162 637.580 0.08 
Uruguay 95.440 
Venezuela 283.380 
Zambia 63.949 144.577 0.44 
Zimbabwe 122.886 277,287 0.44 
TABLE 5: REDUCED FORM ESTIMATION BY INCOME GROUP 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE: Growth of GDP per worker 




(Lagged GDP grawth) 
PIG 
(initisU Price of Investment) 
ZWA 
(Growth of working age population) 
ZH 
(Growth of human capital, per worker) 
HO 
(Log initial human capital, per worker) 
YLO 
(log initial output-labor ratio) 
ZOIL 
(Growth in oil revenues, share of GDP) 
OILRAT 
(Initial oil revenues, % GDP) 
GOV 
(Govemment consumption, % GDP) 
IND 
(Initial % of the workforce in industry) 
TRANSL 


























































































































Standard enors in parenthesis. *(**) indk:ates significance at the 5% (1%) level. 
See Table 7 for definition of high, middle and low income groups. 










































































































































































































Real GDP per capita from Summers and Heston, expressed in 1985 PPP doHais. 
High income: 1980 GDP per capita > $2000; Middle income $2000< 1960 GOP per capita<$1000; 
Low income: i960 GDP per capita <$1000 
1960 GDP per capita for Indonesia not available, 1965 GDP was $67S. 
TABLE 7: ROBUSTNESS TO OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE EFFECTS 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE: Annual Average Growth of GDP per worker 
Method of estimation 
CONSTANT 
LZY 
(Lagged GDP growth) 
PI 
(Initial Price of Investment) 
ZWA 
(Growth of working age population) 
ZH 
(Growth of human capital per worker) 
HO 
(Log initial human capital, per worker) 
YLO 
(log initial output-labor ratio) 
ZOIL 
(Growth in oil revenues, share of GDP) 
OILRAT 
(initial oil revenues, % GDP) 
GOV 
(Government consumption. % GDP) 
IND 
(initial % of the workforce in industry) 
TRANSL 
(Initial log paved roads + railroads, per 
FGCL 
(Log electricity generating capacity, pei 
TELL 


























































































Standard error in parenthesis. * (**) indicate significance at the 5% (1%) level. 
